The Multilevel Governance of Immigration and Settlement: Making Deep Federalism Work

INTRODUCTION

Like commerce and the arts, governance is often hostage to the flavour of the month, or the decade, or the generation, to a theory that purports to embody a guide to the correct practice of statecraft. So it is with multilevel governance, which, at its essence, is the commonsense attempt to ensure that national government policies are formulated and implemented with sufficient flexibility to ensure their appropriateness to the very different conditions in different communities. Elsewhere we have referred to this condition, where it is achieved, as deep federalism (Leo, 2006; Leo et al., 2007; Leo and Enns, 2009; Leo and Andres, 2008).

In the past couple of decades, the question of how best to adjust the intergovernmental distribution of responsibilities and powers to changing circumstances has become an object of study (Leo, 2006) and, in the process, the pursuit of deep federalism has become freighted with competing ideological objectives. A particularly useful formulation of two competing approaches to multilevel governance (Hooghe and Marks, 2002) labels them simply as type I and type II.

According to this formulation, advocates of type I place a great deal of faith in collective decision making, while insisting that it be organ-
nized according to the principle of subsidiarity, whereby each of the various activities of government are carried out at the lowest level possible (Norton, 1994: 28–31; Schwager, 1999; Saint-Martin, 2004; Bradford, 2005). The type II approach to multilevel governance seeks to put it to work as a means of increasing efficiency and maximizing individual choice through the introduction of market mechanisms and procedures into the process of governance. Type II advocates call for jurisdictional fragmentation and argue that a large number of intersecting, task-specific jurisdictions will allow for governance that introduces market mechanisms in order to maximize efficiencies and internalize relevant externalities (Casella and Frey, 1992; Frey and Eichenberger, 1999; Weingast, 1995; Garcea and Pontikes, 2004).

The present article is part of a wider research initiative on multilevel governance that adopts a stance of ideological agnosticism. Our study was formulated in such a way as to avoid entanglement in the well-worn debates over collective versus market-oriented governance by establishing a rationale for multilevel governance, with criteria of good governance flowing from it. Particular instances of multilevel governance could then be judged on the evidence of what works, rather than on ideological grounds.

The rationale for multilevel governance, as defined in our research, is to strike an appropriate balance between the realization of national objectives, on one hand, and the achievement of governance appropriate to the requirements of local communities, on the other, leaving open the question of which particular constellation of organizational forms is best suited to accomplish a particular task (Leo, 2006). This conception treats appropriateness to the particular circumstances of each community, rather than applying any preconceived organizational theory, as the final arbiter of appropriate governance.

In these pages, we present a case study of the multilevel governance of immigration and settlement in Winnipeg. The study is one of a series of comparative case studies in multilevel governance and, together with another case study in the series, dealing with the multilevel governance of immigration and settlement in Vancouver (Leo and Enns, 2009) it provides intriguing evidence on the question of how to achieve appropriate multilevel governance. Instead of either maintaining national sovereignty or devolving significant responsibility for immigration and settlement to localities, Canadian governments have concluded a series of federal-provincial agreements, which leaves the question of whether there is genuine adaptation to the requirements of individual communities entirely in the hands of each provincial government.

As it happens, the British Columbia and Manitoba governments adopted very different approaches. These differences led to a troubled outcome in Vancouver and a model to the rest of the country in Winnipeg. Our findings in Vancouver, which are reported elsewhere in this
journal (Leo and Enns, 2009), were that the provincial government’s determination to impose a market or public choice model—type II governance—on settlement services posed a very real threat to the integrity and effectiveness of a famously well-functioning network of settlement service providers. The imposition of one of the theories we have outlined, therefore, proved to be less than a shining success.

In Winnipeg, as we will see in this article, things stood differently. There we found that the provincial government built an impressively successful system of immigration and settlement, carefully tailored to meet the requirements of disparate Manitoba communities, not along any par-
ticular line of governance theory but on the well-established political and administrative arts of close consultation and co-operation with stakeholders, thoughtful design of a provincial nominee system of immigration, attentive monitoring, and flexible adaptation to lessons learned. The Manitoba government did not look to market-oriented governance as its salvation, nor did it assume, as a type I theorist would, that collective decision making demarcated the royal road to policy success.

Instead, the government delegated decision making and program implementation where it appeared to promise benefits and maintained control where control seemed to be required. It engaged in ongoing program review and regular consultation with community groups in order to identify problems and took the trouble to make adjustments designed to remove the problems. The contrast between the Vancouver and Winnipeg cases illustrates the conclusions that Blatter reached after four careful case studies of multilevel governance in Europe and America. He found different practices in different centres and no clear lines of inevitability in any particular direction. He concluded, “There exist very different stimuli for political institution building... and it is time to get beyond simple dichotomies” (2004: 546).

It must be noted that a pair of case studies cannot resolve a theoretical debate. The strength of case study methodology is its ability to understand a problematic in its details and within the relevant context. Each of our case studies involved careful literature reviews and the amassing of an extensive collection relevant documents and secondary materials, as well as unstructured interviews with major stakeholders and well-informed participants in the public, private and voluntary sectors. We believe that readers of our findings will gain a significant understanding of immigration and settlement in Winnipeg and Vancouver, as we did in the course of our research, findings that have clear applications to many other, similar cases. Our theoretical findings, as well, make a significant contribution to the literature, but they are—as case studies must be—suggestive, rather than definitive.

We turn now to an examination and assessment of the Canada-Manitoba Agreement on Immigration and its implementation in Winnipeg.

**Immigration and Settlement**

Immigration to Canada, and the settlement of new Canadians, is the subject of a series of federal–provincial agreements that are different for each province, in recognition of the fact that each community presents a very different combination of opportunities and problems. For example, in 2006, the most recent year for which Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) offers a tabulation, Saint John, New Brunswick received 547
immigrants, or 0.2 per cent of the Canadian total; Winnipeg received 7,698 (3.1 per cent), and Vancouver received 367,271 (14.4 per cent) (2006). As a result, Vancouver was primarily concerned with the challenges of settling the very large volume of immigrants that could be counted on to arrive at one of Canada's three primary immigrant destinations (Leo and Enns, 2009), while both Saint John (Anderson and Leo, 2006) and Winnipeg were keen to attract more immigrants.

In both Winnipeg and Saint John, therefore, provincial nominee agreements, designed to increase the numbers of immigrants, have played a prominent role in policy making and implementation. In this paper, we look at Winnipeg's provincial nominee program and then turn to settlement services. As we have noted, it is the government of Manitoba, not municipal government, which implements the immigration settlement program. In order to understand immigration settlement in Winnipeg, therefore, we have to evaluate the provincial program. We conclude the discussion of immigration settlement with an assessment of Winnipeg's role.

**Provincial Nominee Program**

Canada's provincial nominee programs are incentive-based strategies to draw immigrants to destinations other than Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver. Immigrants are selected who will fill specified labour market needs and who are deemed well suited to integrate into life in Manitoba. Rather than applying to Citizenship and Immigration Canada for permanent resident status through the federal family or independent classes, prospective immigrants apply directly to their province of choice. The province reviews applicants based on its own criteria, rather than using the federal points system, and then nominates those who qualify.

Provincial nominees receive priority processing by federal immigration authorities, bypassing assessment at the federal level. Federal officials retain responsibility for criminal, security, and medical checks, but in other respects the nominating province takes over assessment of provincial nominees. Applying through the nominee program offers the carrot of faster processing times, and in most cases, easier-to-meet assessment criteria. Among the categories of immigrants eligible to apply are the following (Province of Manitoba, 2007a).

Employer-direct: Gives top priority to applicants already working full-time in Manitoba, or who have a job offer from a Manitoba employer.

Family support: Acts as a complement to the federal family class, and is for applicants who can prove that they have strong family support in Manitoba.

Community support: For applicants who have evidence of support from an ethno-cultural community.
International student: For international students who have graduated from a post-secondary program in Manitoba, received a full-time job offer in their field of studies, and have a post-graduation work permit.

The Manitoba government began pursuing immigration as early as the 1970s, partly because of a consensus, at least among elite groups, which would be considered remarkable in many other jurisdictions. Because both the province and Winnipeg are growing slowly, additional population is much more likely to be seen as an asset than it is in areas that are growing more quickly (Leo and Brown, 2000). Thus the business community wants immigration to address labour shortages and the City of Winnipeg wants to expand its tax base and population and to revitalize decaying neighbourhoods with new residents. The right wants economic growth and more workers, and the left wants to meet humanitarian goals while building a more diverse society. In the prosperous southern Manitoba cities of Steinbach and Winkler, there is both a need for more workers and a desire on the part of many to build on German Mennonite traditions. In Winnipeg, the Société franco-manitobaine seeks to bring French-speaking immigrants into St. Boniface, the French Quarter; the declining Jewish community is looking for new members, and in the flourishing Filipino community there is a demand to bring in family and friends.

Therefore, whether under Tory or NDP governments, the provincial government was prepared to make the necessary infrastructure and resources available. Unlike many provinces, where the immigration, settlement, and language activities are split up into different departments and jammed in with files like education or social services, Manitoba has had a dedicated immigration division since 1990, which co-ordinates all immigration and settlement activity within one department (Clément, 2002: 16). Nevertheless, it took time and persuasion to get an agreement.

In 1996, after “a couple years of serious discussion and a lot of arm-wrestling,” the Canada-Manitoba Immigration Agreement was signed, outlining the province’s objectives and providing a framework within which to negotiate the provincial nominee and settlement service agreements which would be developed over the next two years (Clément, 2003: 198). A successful pilot program in 1996 to recruit sewing machine operators to fill Manitoba skill shortages opened the door to expansion of the program (Huynh, 2004: 5), and, as it happened, the province was looking for changes. The federal selection system favoured the high-tech workers sought in central Canada but rejected the trades people Manitoba urgently needed. In 1998, the federal–provincial negotiations paid off with the Provincial Nominee and Settlement Services Annexes to the Canada–Manitoba Immigration Agreement, granting Manitoba responsibility for nominating 200 applicants per year.
The original agreement was extended for an extra year in 2001, and on June 6, 2003, a new agreement was signed, preserving the provincial nominee and settlement services agreements, and containing new commitments to focus on regional needs, address the issue of qualifications recognition, and focus on foreign and temporary workers and international students, as well as an understanding to “consult the Franco-phone minority community” on immigration issues (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2003a).

The program started modestly in 1998, with an initial allocation from the federal government to nominate 200 immigrants and their families each year for two years. The program grew, according to Gerald Clément, Assistant Deputy Minister of Labour and Immigration, “beyond our wildest expectations” (2003: 199). By 2003, the limit on provincial nominees had been removed, with annual figures to be determined each year in consultations between Canada and the province (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2003b).

Provincial nominees have directly contributed to record immigration levels and population growth figures for Manitoba (Janzen, 2005). In 1998, the number of immigrants was 2,993—a figure that made the province’s goal of bringing in 10,000 newcomers by 2006 seem laughable—but the goal was reached (see Table 1). This growth in immigration levels is directly attributable to the PNP, which was the route taken by two-thirds of Manitoba immigrants in 2006.

**Settlement Services Agreement**

The 1998 agreement that set the nominee program in motion also included an agreement giving Manitoba complete responsibility for the design,
administration, and delivery of settlement services, including orientation and counselling, adult language training, labour market access services, and assistance for other organizations that provide settlement services (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 1998). In return, the federal government provides funds. In the first two years of the program, Manitoba received $3.55 million per year. This was increased to $5.32 million in the 2001–2002 fiscal year, as Manitoba’s immigrant intake grew (Province of Manitoba, 2001). By 2006–2007, the figure had reached $13.1 million, and the allocation for 2007–2008 was just short of $15 million. The province has also committed substantial funding of its own to immigration and settlement. For example, in fiscal 2004–2005 the projected provincial immigration and settlement budget was $11.1 million. In the rest of the country, with the exception of British Columbia and Quebec, which also have settlement agreements, the federal government is responsible for the delivery and funding of settlement programs. In carrying out that responsibility, it comes in for a considerable amount of criticism, criticism that is suggestive of the problems that arise in trying to apply uniform national criteria to diverse localities and therefore illustrative of the importance of multilevel governance in this policy domain. For example, in a 2003 report, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration reported complaints that Citizenship and Immigration Canada micromanaged the operations of settlement providers, and that “any variation from the line-by-line authorizations leads to significant administrative difficulties” (Canada, 2002: 9). The department has also been criticized for focusing too much on meeting “front-end” settlement needs, at the expense of long-run integration needs (Omidvar and Richmond, 2003: 8).

In Manitoba, the provincial government’s management of settlement, backed by widespread public support, has produced a much more favourable result. Prominent representatives of the settlement provider community, as well as impartial outside observers, speak highly of the provincial government’s programs. Although they generally agree that more funding is needed, they contend that Manitoba’s performance stands out nationally.

According to Tom Denton, chair of the Manitoba Immigration Council and former executive director of the International Centre of Winnipeg, long an outspoken advocate for immigrants, Manitoba’s settlement services are “probably the best in Canada.” The province scored the highest on a 2002 inter-provincial settlement “report card” prepared by the BC Coalition for Immigrant Integration, obtaining a “B” (Canada, 2003: 12). Emily Shane, Executive Director of Jewish Child and Family Services, which works closely with the provincial government in the selection and settlement of immigrants, applauded the decision to devolve
responsibility for settlement, citing the “approachability and flexibility” of the provincial government.\(^4\) As well, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration (Canada, 2003: 12) praised Manitoba for having the only advanced language training program in Canada offered free to newcomers.

The provincial government has developed two “community-based” language training programs that meet the unique needs of immigrant women and seniors. The women’s program provides English instruction to mothers who find it hard to attend in regular training hours, and who may lack confidence and feel isolated. The program for senior citizens recognizes that they are often isolated and lonely in a new country where they suffer a language barrier. The program teaches English at a learner-centred pace and is as much about providing immigrant seniors a chance to meet, make friends, and get out of the house as it is about teaching English (Doan and MacFarlane, 2003). Manitoba has also created an innovative occupation-specific language program, in which newcomers acquire job-specific language skills during the workday, learning while earning wages. Such creative and innovative programs would not be possible under the federal program, service providers argue. Tom Denton says, “settlement is a local thing requiring fine tuning to the local scene.” When Manitoba took over in 1998, Denton reports it was “an instant improvement.”\(^5\)

To be sure, more could—and, service providers insist, should—be done. For example, the main provider of settlement services in Manitoba, the International Centre, had not, at the time of our research, received a funding increase in the past three years, despite steep increases in the numbers of immigrants, and had “cut their administrative staff to the bare bones.” Executive Director Linda Lelande explained that well-educated people with considerable expertise are being lost to higher-salaried positions in other organizations.\(^6\) Emily Shane argued that while settlement services were adequate, “huge amounts of money” were required.\(^7\) Shane and Lelande did not blame the province for these shortfalls. Manitoba receives its fair share of the nation’s settlement budget, and, as noted, tops it up significantly with provincial funds, but the province can only add so much. In short, service providers argued that Manitoba was doing as well as could be expected, considering the resources available.

**Responsiveness to the Community**

One of the most important reasons for the success of Manitoba’s immigration and settlement programs—and, at the same time, one of their most important benefits—is the provincial government’s early and continuing consultation with community stakeholders. Close relations with the community not only made it possible for the program to achieve the
adaptation to local circumstances that multilevel governance makes possible but also laid the basis for community collaboration in achieving effective and economical operation of the program.

The Business Council of Manitoba, eager to find a way of alleviating labour shortages, was an early supporter of increased immigration. The council’s support “gave the politicians cover” by framing immigration as an economic, not political issue. Tom Denton explained that “the Business Council fostered community dialogue, the Premier’s Economic Council has taken advice from the community, the Provincial government has listened and has acted in both predictable and ingenious ways” (2005).

Consultation has gone well beyond the business community to include immigrant-serving organizations, ethno-cultural community groups, rural communities, employers, residents in general, and immigrants themselves. Gerald Clément, an assistant deputy minister with Manitoba Labour and Immigration, argues that community involvement has played a key role in Manitoba’s immigration programming, claiming that “one of the keys to our success has been an openness to partnerships with communities ... be [they] ethnic or geographic, [they] are an important dimension of the immigrant integration process” (2003:199).

Manitoba’s approach to immigration and settlement has been based on cultivating an understanding of those communities and their needs, including, as we noted above, the German Mennonite, Jewish, Franco-phone, and Filipino communities. There are also community-specific needs to be addressed once immigrants have arrived. Employers want newcomers to learn occupation-specific language skills, and isolated groups, such as single mothers and seniors, need language training to help them break their isolation. These are examples of the case for multilevel governance’s adaptability to local conditions, program requirements that are unlikely to be met by the central government.

The attention the government pays to individual communities is repaid in kind as community organizations rally to help make programming more effective and economical. This is part of the rationale for the community support stream, designed for applicants who have evidence of support from an ethno-cultural community. Ethno-cultural or regional community organizations may enter into community support agreements with the province, thereby assuming responsibility to pre-screen potential applicants. Applicants may apply to the community support stream if they have a letter of support from a community group that holds a community support agreement with the province.

Only one organization, the Jewish Federation of Winnipeg (JFW) was party to a support agreement at the time of our research. Under their agreement, the JFW did all pre-screening, invited applicants with potential for an exploratory visit, assisted applicants in filling out the application for provincial nominee status, and delivered the application to the
province. The JFW did not receive funding for its services, having agreed to take on the assessment of prospective immigrants because it served its own interests. In effect, the province was capitalizing on the JFW’s desire for more immigrants to discharge some of its own administrative responsibilities at no cost.

Other organizations work to bring immigrants to Manitoba without being party to a support agreement. An example is the Société franco-manitobaine, long active in support of French-speaking immigrants. But whether the relations are formal or informal, ongoing community consultations, can, under favourable circumstances, help to ensure outcomes that are more reflective of community demands, more efficient and more effective. Manitoba has done a credible job of producing outcomes that are both responsive and efficacious.

Learning and Adaptation

Though Manitoba’s program has been widely lauded as a success, this has not come without considerable effort on the part of the provincial government. After a bumpy start in 1998, the province altered the nominee program to make it more responsive and flexible, beginning with small alterations, proceeding to a major re-design in May 2004.

Before May 2004, the nominee program was “a miserably failed program” in the gloomy assessment of Evelyn Hecht, immigration officer for the Jewish Federation of Winnipeg (2005). The first problem was the “high demand occupation list,” comprising occupations in demand in Manitoba, that was periodically updated to reflect changing labour market needs. Before May 2004, if a prospective immigrant’s occupation was on the list, they were readily nominated, even without other work skills or language competence. As the program became popular and processing times increased, successful nominees were finding that by the time they arrived, the labour market had changed. Because the list of high-demand occupations could not keep up with the changing labour market, many newcomers were unable to find work when they arrived. Since they had been selected for a specific job and had not been required to have any transferable work skills, minimum language skills, or financial reserves, many arrivals became dependent on the services of settlement organizations.

In 2002, the federal government worsened Manitoba’s plight by stiffening its own entry requirements for immigrants. As a result, Manitoba was flooded with applicants seeking a back door into the country, and processing times grew longer, while the high-demand occupation list on which acceptance was based became less and less reflective of the labour market conditions facing immigrants at the time of entry.
These problems were aggravated by the conduct of immigration consultants, people who complete applications for prospective immigrants in return for a fee. Before the federal government regulated the industry in 2003, the ethical conduct of consultants varied widely. Some charged immigrants up to $10,000 for help in filling out their applications, others forged documents and lied on applications in order to increase their clients’ chances of acceptance. Applicants were accepted based on bogus job offers, phoney work experience or fake educational credentials. This phoney documentation had devastating impacts on newcomers. Many arrived with no skills, very little money, no real job offer and no friends or social connections in Manitoba. Their need for settlement assistance put a serious strain on settlement service providers.12

Before May 2004, therefore, the integrity of the provincial nominee program was at risk both because of the problems with the high-demand occupation list and for other reasons. The province could not keep up with the applications coming in and was failing to scrutinize job offers or check if they were bona fide. Too much weight was put on a job offer at the expense of transferable skills, language skills, education, and connections to Manitoba.

In May 2004, a redesigned nominee program addressed these difficulties. Instead of basing eligibility for nomination mainly on the existence of a job offer, new rules emphasized long-term employability and community connections. First, the list of high-demand occupations was abandoned in favour of a new “restricted occupations list,” comprising jobs that required licensing and accreditation in Manitoba, or for which there was an oversupply of workers. Applicants from almost any occupation could now apply. Even applicants whose jobs were on the restricted list could apply, provided they received their license or certification to work in Manitoba beforehand. Many immigrant professionals have arrived to Canada only to find out that their qualifications are not recognized, a problem prevented by this new list, which ensures that newcomers will be eligible to work upon arrival.

A second change was the introduction of priority processing streams, which allowed applications to be sorted and prioritized according to applicants’ connections to Manitoba and reasons for applying. The stream, referred to above, included such categories as “employer-direct,” “family support,” and “community support.” The provincial government can flexibly increase or decrease the inflow from each stream based on changing needs or economic conditions. The new streams have other advantages. The problem of bogus job offers was addressed with the employer-direct stream, which imposed a new condition requiring employers to have their job offers pre-approved by the province before offering them to prospective nominees. This allows the institution of checks on employers to make sure they have legitimate businesses, have sought workers locally, and
have the capacity to hire newcomers. The employer-direct stream allows
the province to be more in tune with the needs of employers in Mani-
toba. By prioritizing this stream, and increasing their scrutiny of job offers,
employer-selected workers can be rapidly brought over to address cur-
rent labour shortages.

Further supporting the new emphasis on immigrants’ long-term
employability and community connections, the redesigned program shifted
to a more holistic assessment of an applicant’s potential for adapting to
life in Manitoba. Even under the employer-direct stream, applicants were
now required to “show a strong potential to settle successfully and per-
manently” (Province of Manitoba, 2007b). Under all streams, require-
ments focused on “transferable skills,” by emphasizing work experience,
education, and language skills. In addition, applicants to the family sup-
port and community support streams were required to show that they were
adaptable (in addition to having a family member or community group
sign for them), either by proving their employability or by showing that
they had sufficient funds and supports in the province.

Another change, made to ensure that prospective immigrants really
intended to stay in Manitoba, was a requirement that the applicant supply
documented evidence of connections to Manitoba. Previously, only a
rather nebulous, difficult-to-verify claim of having “family or family-
like connections” had been required. Under the rewritten rules, the prov-
ince required family members or close friends to vouch in writing for
the applicant. A signed affidavit of support from a “close relative” was
to be included in family support stream applications (Province of Mani-
toba, 2007a).

Family support stream requirements, in addition to providing some
assurance of adaptability, also respond to family and community needs.
Growing communities, including the Filipino community in Winnipeg and
Germans in southwestern Manitoba, are enabled to speed the immigra-
tion of their qualified loved ones. Thus Manitoba welcomes newcomers
who have every likelihood of staying, as it is the bond of family pulling
them to the province, while at the same time serving as an attraction to
newcomers who can ameliorate labour shortages and help to rebuild
decaying neighbourhoods. Researchers have found that concentrations of
people from the same ethnic community serve as an attraction to immi-
grants (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2001: 56; McDonald, 2004:
98). Elizabeth McIsaac explains that “establishing a critical mass of peo-
ple from the same ethno-cultural background can ... be an attraction to
the city,” and she cites Manitoba’s family program as an example of how
to succeed in creating such a “magnet” (2003a: 5).

Finally, changes were made to take advantage of the fact that inter-
national students are newcomers who have already adapted to Canada
and are likely to be qualified to work in Manitoba. At the Pioneers 2000
Conference on Immigration, held in Winnipeg and sponsored in part by the Business Council of Manitoba, one of the main recommendations was that “it should be easier for student visa holders to transfer to landed immigrant status” (Gibbons and Vander Ploeg, 2000: 32). The introduction of the international student stream made it easier for student newcomers to become permanent residents, building on a 2003 two-year pilot program which allowed international students to work off campus (Province of Manitoba, 2004: 24).

The provincial nominee program, therefore, was thoroughly revamped, and continues to evolve, to improve the likelihood of successful immigrant adaptation to Manitoba (Province of Manitoba, 2007b). At the same time, the government took action to address the problem of phoney documentation and false claims on applications, by requiring that immigration consultants be residents of Manitoba and members in good standing of the Canadian Society of Immigration Consultants.16 Evelyn Hecht of the Jewish Federation of Winnipeg, echoing views widely held in the service provider community, saw the province’s goals as being in line with the goals of the community, and gave the government credit for having “recognized where they have made mistakes, and worked really hard to fix loopholes.” She added that the province “has come a long way and become very successful,” proving more flexible than the federal government (2005).

What About Local Government?

Why is the provincial government maintaining close liaison with community groups in furthering the recruitment and settlement of immigrants? Why not the level of government whose spokespersons are fond of characterizing themselves as being “closest to the people”? The case for municipal involvement has been made by a number of commentators. The Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration suggest that cities should “directly recruit people to suit their particular needs” (Canada, 2002: 23). Omidvar and Richmond have recommended that cities should take the lead in settlement programming, and act as “brokers in bringing others to the table, including federal and provincial departments ... NGO service providers, and immigrant refugee communities” (2003: 16). Elizabeth McIsaac agrees, arguing that cities should be “positioned as the designer and driver of settlement planning, while federal and provincial governments [should] take the role of facilitators and supporters of locally determined initiatives” (2003b: 6).

Under Winnipeg’s former Mayor Glen Murray, a municipal activist of national stature, there were some tentative moves in that direction. One was the establishment, in 2002, of the Winnipeg Private Refugee
Sponsorship Assurance Program. The city set aside $250,000 to cover refugee support in cases where the private sponsor is no longer able to meet the commitment (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2002). Once established, this program was handed off to Welcome Place, a local settlement services provider, for administration. At this writing, the funds have not had to be drawn upon. The other Winnipeg policy with some relevance to immigration is the Citizen Equity Committee. A product of Murray’s 2001 Mayor’s Task Force on Diversity, it possesses a broad mandate to increase diversity in the city’s workplace. The implications for accommodation of new Canadians are obvious.

Under Murray’s successor, Mayor Sam Katz, a believer in small government, there have been no further moves toward involvement in immigration or settlement. Is Katz right not to move forward in the directions that Murray was setting? There seems to be a case for municipal minimalism in this instance. Considering the broad scope of Manitoba’s provincial nominee program, with small towns prominently involved, provincial administration arguably makes sense, especially given a provincial government that is committed to close working relationships with community groups.

In Toronto and the Vancouver, by contrast, matters stand differently. For both cities, the primary immigration and settlement concern is accommodating large numbers of immigrants who come of their own accord, rather than trying to attract newcomers, and their problem is not one that they share with other parts of their respective provinces outside the immediate metropolitan areas. As a result, it makes sense for each of those cities to manage at least some aspects of settlement, and problems arising from settlement, in their own way. And, in point of fact, both municipalities address settlement issues in a variety of ways, including mediation of inter-ethnic conflict, funding service providers, advocating on behalf of immigrants to other levels of government and ensuring that municipal services are provided in culturally appropriate ways (Good, 2006: ch. 4–5).

That seems to make as much sense for Toronto and Vancouver as Manitoba’s very different approach does for that province. The contrast between the circumstances of Manitoba, on one hand, and those of Toronto and Vancouver, on the other, in effect makes a compelling case for the flexibility and adaptability to local circumstances that come with multilevel governance. Manitoba’s creditable achievements are not the product of either type I or type II multilevel governance, nor would the application of any other single policy template promise success. The secret of Manitoba’s success, rather, is the assiduous application of the long-understood, though difficult, political and administrative arts of close consultation and co-operation with stakeholders, thoughtful program design, attentive monitoring, and flexible adaptation to lessons learned.
Conclusion

By chance or otherwise, the senior author of this paper became interested, in the late 1980s, in trying to understand how the relations between local communities and the national state are evolving in an age of globalization (Leo and Fenton, 1990; Leo, 1995; Leo, 1997), a topic that has gained considerable currency. Since then, he has directed 13 case studies involving or focusing on multilevel governance, and those studies, taken together, offer much support for the conclusion we have reached in these pages on the basis of two of those 13 studies: No two communities and no two policy problems are exactly alike. It is therefore not surprising that the search for unifying theory, as well as the search for governance templates that cover all eventualities, raises many questions while providing few definitive answers.

A quick overview of some of the main findings of the 13 case studies brings these points out more clearly. The first of the studies was an examination of the politics of regional growth management in Portland, Oregon. It was not conceived as a study of multilevel governance, but it became one by virtue of one of the study’s main findings, namely that the most important single support for a surprisingly successful set of metropolitan growth management measures was the imposition of planning guidelines by the State of Oregon. In this case, therefore, it could reasonably be argued that good local governance was based on centralization of power (Leo, 1998). The finding in this case echoed one of the findings of a comparative review (Leo, 1997) of a number of European and North American case studies carried out by other researchers, not included in the present count of 13 studies. The review, again, showed that centralization of power provided a viable political basis for good urban planning.

Returning to the 13 case studies, we have now looked at the findings of three of them: Vancouver, where provincial oversight of immigration and settlement worked out badly (Leo and Enns, 2009); and Winnipeg and Portland (Leo, 1998), where provincial or state oversight in two very different kinds of cases, immigration settlement and land use planning, both produced creditable results. The 10 remaining case studies included three studies of the local implementation of the National Homelessness Initiative (in Vancouver, Winnipeg and Saint John, New Brunswick) (Leo and August, 2006; Leo, 2006); a study of immigration and settlement in Saint John (Leo, 2006); and studies of a welfare-to-work scheme (Leo and Andres, 2008), three federal lands cases (Leo and Pyl, 2007), aboriginal policy, and emergency planning, all in Winnipeg (Leo et al., 2007).

In all of those cases, we either found that strong local involvement in formulation and implementation produced good policy, or that failure to pay sufficient attention to local circumstances and demands led to unsatisfactory results—or a little bit of both.
The pattern, in other words, is that there is no pattern. After four careful case studies of multilevel governance in Europe and America, Blatter reached a similar conclusion (2004). In his study, he tried to verify or falsify Casella’s theory that in “network society,” “spaces of flows” supersede “spaces of places” as the dominant logic of political and administrative organization. His principal conclusion is worth quoting at length: “On both continents,” he says,

we can observe a transition from “government to governance” ... Nevertheless, there exist not only significant differences in respect to the integration and the role of private and non-profit actors in regional governance. A closer look at the ties that bind the actors together in institutions of governance makes clear that we have to overcome functionalist approaches which assume that these transformations are necessary adjustments of the political system to changing technical and socio-economic features or natural/environmental imperatives. There exist very different stimuli for political institution-building across national boundaries and it is time to get beyond simple dichotomies. (2004: 546)

Circumstances alter cases. Indeed, if there is any point at all to multilevel governance, it is that circumstances must alter cases, that we can achieve better governance by treating each policy and each community as a discrete, individual set of circumstances, not entirely the same as any other. Theories can be enormously useful in providing insight into problems of governance, and directing our attention to phenomena we might otherwise have overlooked, but anyone who believes that a theory of governance can be applied, like a recipe for goulash, to the production of a predictable and satisfying outcome in every individual circumstance greatly underestimates the subtlety and complexity policy making and implementation.

If we ever do find a theory that covers all cases, or a governance template that can be applied everywhere, the case for multilevel governance may well disappear. If governance becomes a matter of applying a template, rather than carefully considering each set of circumstances as a unique problem, requiring the separate application of subtle political and administrative arts, we may as well save ourselves the trouble and expense of multilevel governance and simply apply the template from the centre. We are unlikely to see that day.

Notes
1 Mary Backhouse, Immigration and Multiculturalism Policy Analyst, Labour and Immigration Manitoba. Personal communication, February 8, 2005.
2 Calculated from notes provided by Morrish (2006).
3 Tom Denton, chair, Manitoba Immigration Council. Personal communication, February 27, 2005
The statements about Portland are bound to provoke disagreement. At the time of the 1998 study, and to this day, Portland’s system of regional growth management has been a storm centre of academic debate. The findings in Leo (1998) were not that Metropolitan Portland is a nirvana, or that there is nothing left to argue about. The study did, however, establish that some improbable achievements in governance were registered, and that those achievements owed much to the existence of a firm, Oregon state regulatory regime.

References


Morris, Margot. 2006. Director, Strategic Planning and Program Support Branch, Immigration and Multiculturalism Division, Manitoba Labour and Immigration. Interview, May 29.


